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Abstract
Parliamentary elections often result in the formation of a coalition government. While the legislative process allows actors
within a coalition government to monitor each other, little attention has focused on how opposition parties respond to
coalition government. We argue that opposition parties have incentives to uncover and highlight differences and tensions
within the governing coalition. A strategy by the opposition to use legislative tools to uncover policy conflicts and
ministerial drift within the coalition increases intra-coalition tensions, potentially generating electoral costs for the
governing parties, and potentially even hastening the coalition’s demise. To test our argument, we build and analyse a new
dataset of parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons covering the 2010–15 coalition. As expected, the main
opposition party appears to strategically focus questions towards policy areas that uncover intra-coalition tensions. This
research highlights the importance of opposition parties in parliamentary democracies.
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Parliamentary elections produce winners and losers, not
least by helping to shape which party or parties go on to
form the government. For understandable reasons, much of
the research on parliamentary government has focused on
the winners: the individual legislators who are elected and
the party or parties who get to form the government. Par-
ticular attention has been paid to coalition governments –
cabinets comprising more than one political party – in-
cluding asking why particular coalitions form and how
otherwise competitive political parties are able to govern
together. Moving beyond a focus on the government for-
mation stage, a growing body of research has highlighted
the role of legislative institutions in helping parties in co-
alition government to keep tabs on each other – ensuring
that ministers are not shirking from any policy compromises
and positions agreed at the government formation stage
(André et al., 2016; Höhmann and Sieberer 2020; Martin
2004;Martin andWhitaker 2019;Martin and Vanberg 2004,
2005, 2011; Zubek 2015). But this literature on legislatures
and coalition monitoring assumes that it is legislators from
parties within the coalition that are using legislative tools,
such as parliamentary committees or parliamentary ques-
tions, to keep tabs on each other. In contrast, (typically
earlier) work on executive-legislative relations has em-
phasized that it is the opposition – the party or parties
represented in the legislature but not in the cabinet – that
provides oversight of the government (Blondel 1973; King
1976; Polsby 1975; Punnett 1973).
Surprisingly little attention has focused on the possible
strategic opportunities available to opposition parties in the
context of coalition government. Our aim in this article is to
explore whether or not opposition parties within the leg-
islative arena respond strategically to the dynamics of co-
alition government. By dynamics of coalition government
we mean the potential for intra-coalition policy conflict and
in particular the potential for individual ministers to drift
from implementing agreed coalition policy (Thies 2001).
By strategic response we mean opposition behaviour tar-
geted towards exposing or highlighting intra-coalition
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tensions given coalition dynamics, with the proximate aim
of causing coalition instability and infighting and an
electoral goal of undermining voters’ satisfaction with the
coalition.1 Opposition oversight activities that uncover or
draw attention to policy conflicts within a coalition gov-
ernment may generate electoral costs for one or more of the
governing parties at the next election or may even hasten the
coalition’s demise (possibly allowing the opposition to enter
government mid-term).
To test our argument, we build and analyse a dataset of
parliamentary questions in the British House of Commons
covering the 2010–15 coalition. We create a dyadic dataset
that includes all combinations of opposition legislators
(MPs) and government departments. We analyse this to
assess how far intra-coalition differences on policy affect
questions asked by opposition MPs. To anticipate, we find
that opposition parties appear to strategically focus ques-
tions towards topics that are associated with intra-coalition
tensions. Contrary to now-conventional perspectives, it is
not just parties in coalition government that are keeping tabs
on each other. For their own reasons, the opposition party
has incentives to monitor the coalition agreement, albeit to
undermine the coalition. Our findings thus lend support to
the proposition that legislative institutions play a key role
during periods of coalition government. And this is so even
in a legislature such as the United Kingdom parliament that
rarely experiences multiparty governments. Additionally,
this article contributes to a small but growing literature that
explores the role and behaviour of opposition parties in the
legislative arena, suggesting that they play a more nuanced
role in terms of executive oversight (and specifically coa-
lition government) than previously considered [see, for
example, Loxbo and Sjölin (2017) who argue against the
‘waning-of-opposition’ thesis].
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Next
we briefly review the literature on legislatures and coalition
government.We then explore why we believe it is rational for
opposition parties to seek to identify and publicize policy
wedges (Van de Wardt et al., 2014) within the governing
coalition. The next section introduces our case, followed by
our data, results and analysis. We conclude with a review of
the findings, discussion of wider implications and, given the
current study’s limitations, suggestions for further research.
Monitoring needs and known mechanisms
Coalition governments are strange beasts. Parties compete
at elections for votes, but some may then successfully
bargain to form a coalition government, jointly taking the
reins of government until the next general election (or until
the coalition dissolves). Coalition government requires
these otherwise competitive governing parties to cooperate
over the production and implementation of public policy. At
the same time, potential for conflict exists because parties in
a coalition govern in the shadow of elections where they will
typically compete directly against each other for votes
(Fortunato 2019). Moreover, individual ministers and the
parties to which they belong usually have their own policy
preferences. Coalition government is only possible because
parties are willing to compromise on these preferences in
order to govern jointly. Ministers in a coalition government
have a particular incentive to deviate from the agreed-upon
policy positions exactly because different parties tend to
prefer different policies.
In many countries, a formal coalition agreement sets out
the compromise. But any such agreements need to be po-
liced, lest ministers shirk and revert to their party’s policy
preferences (Thies 2001; Saalfeld 2000; Müller and Strøm
2008). Recent studies have pointed to the importance of the
legislative process as a means to police the coalition
agreement. In a seminal contribution, Martin and Vanberg
(2011) suggest that the legislative process serves as a
structural solution to the keeping-tabs problem inherent to
coalition government. Coalition cabinets introduce bills on
which the coalition partners agree, early in the term and
postpone more controversial bills (Martin 2004). Proposed
legislation on which there is disagreement among the co-
alition partners faces greater scrutiny during the legislative
process (Martin and Vanberg 2004). André, Depauw and
Martin (2016) argue that coalition parties’ need to keep tabs
on each other even shapes legislative organization, in
particular, the committee system’s structures and powers.
Where multiparty government is the norm, legislatures tend
to develop strong committees. Zubek (2015) finds that
reforms expanding committee power are most likely when
ideological conflict within the coalition government is
greatest. Martin and Whitaker (2019) look beyond com-
mittees, suggesting that parties in coalition government use
parliamentary questions to keep tabs on each other.
As rich as the literature is on legislatures and coalition
government, surprisingly little attention has focused on the
possible role of opposition parties in the context of coalition
government.2 We respond to this gap by suggesting that it is
rational for opposition parties to use oversight mechanisms




In this section, we explain why and how opposition parties
can be expected to use legislative oversight tools to uncover
intra-coalition conflict between parties in coalition gov-
ernment. We begin by setting out some general assumptions
about the functions and motivations of opposition parties.
While our perspective applies to any opposition party, for
simplicity we will assume just one opposition party.4
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One role of the opposition is to use the legislative process
to engage with and critically assess the government’s
proposed legislation (Brazier, 1999; Norton, 2008; Potter,
1965). However, the government in parliamentary regimes
is often said to dominate the law-making process, leaving
little opportunity for opposition influence and leading to
executive dominance of the legislature (Lijphart 2012: 129).
On closer inspection, executive-legislative imbalance is
arguably aligned with the power and procedural imbalance
between the government and the opposition within the
legislature (at least under parliamentarism). Under parlia-
mentarism, the perception is that the executive does what it
wants and gets the legislation it wants, particularly if it
controls a majority of seats in the legislature (Mezey 1979:
3). Thus although, there is a de jure role of the legislature
and opposition, neither the legislature as a whole nor the
opposition in particular tend to play central de facto roles in
law making in many parliamentary systems (De Giorgi and
Ilonszki 2018).
But an opposition party has a second and arguably more
influential role: to hold the government – and through the
government, the wider system of public administration – to
account. Kreppel (2014: 86) defines legislative accountability
and oversight as ‘the monitoring of executive agencies tasked
with the implementation of policy decisions, and regular
engagement with the political executive to insure it is meeting
its commitments to the public and adequately addressing the
various policy needs of the country’. The key to oversight is
information and the capacity to explore what the executive is,
and is not, doing. An opposition party may have at its dis-
posal a number of parliamentary devices to aid oversight of
the government. These mechanisms provide a means for the
opposition to hold to account the executive – either the
political executive, the bureaucracy or the wider public
sector. Specific tools to control the executive include par-
liamentary questions, committee investigations and hearings,
and – arguably the ultimate form of oversight in a parlia-
mentary regime – the power to dismiss the executive or
individual members of the executive.
We should step back and ask whatmotivates an opposition
party to engage in executive oversight. Having oversight as a
role and function of a legislature is all well and good, but why
would a party (and in particular an opposition party) invest in
oversight activities? The reason, we suggest, is that an op-
position party will pursue electoral and office goals, and these
goals can be achieved through engaging in executive over-
sight. For Downs (1957) political parties exist, and thus
formulate policy, to win elections. Elections are won by
maximizing votes and political parties respond to voters’
preferences in order to accumulate as many votes as possible
(see, for example, Bäck and Debus 2016; Ezrow et al., 2011;
Scarrow et al., 2017; Strøm 1990).5
An opposition party can maximize electoral support in
part by pursuing activities that reduce the electoral support
for incumbent governing parties. As Cheibub and
Przeworski (1999, 225) note, electoral ‘accountability is
a retrospective mechanism, in that sense that the actions of
rulers are judged ex post by the effects they have’. One
strategy to reduce governing parties’ electoral popularity is
to maximize opposition oversight of the executive. Over-
sight exposes the governments’ policy weaknesses, with
consequences for how voters perceive the incumbent
government’s performance.6
In situations of single-party government, or where the
legislature has a majority and minority party, one strategy
available to an opposition (minority) party is to seek to
divide the governing party. Research on US politics dem-
onstrates that an attractive strategy for the minority party in
Congress is to concentrate its attention on policy issues
about which the majority party in Congress is somehow
divided (Carmines and Stimson 1989). This drives a wedge
between legislators in the governing party thereby under-
mining the majority party’s platform and legislative party
unity. Or, to cite Schattschneider (1960: 69–70), ‘the effort
in all political struggles is to exploit cracks in [one’s] op-
position while attempting to consolidate one’s own side’.
Applied to a parliamentary system, the wedge issue
thesis suggests that an opposition party should focus at-
tention on issues which divide the governing parties. We
believe that this thesis can apply equally to multiparty
governments, with the opposition specifically focused on
policy differences between the parties, and more specifi-
cally, ministerial drift from the coalition agreement.7
Our argument – and the core theoretical contribution of this
article – is to suggest a more nuanced approach to under-
standing opposition oversight strategies in legislatures with a
coalition government. Yes, we still expect the opposition to
engage in oversight of the government, exactly for the reasons
discussed above. But oversight of coalition governments in
particular presents an opposition party with opportunities to,
as we put it, divide and conquer the governing parties.
The divide and conquer strategy involves the opposition
party uncovering, exposing and publicizing policy conflicts
between the parties in the coalition government and in
particular, in cases where ministers in the coalition are
failing to implement agreed coalition policy in favour of
their own party preference. Monitoring the coalition
agreement in this way will allow the opposition to maximize
tensions within the coalition. This may negatively impact
voters’ perception of the incumbent government (with
electoral costs for the governing parties and electoral re-
wards for the opposition party).
Indeed, if opposition oversight is effective at uncovering
policy divergences between agreed coalition policy and
ministerial activities, it may challenge the fundamental
foundations and trust of the ruling coalition. If so, a divide
and conquer strategy may have even more immediate office
payoffs. This potential payoff to the opposition party comes
Whitaker and Martin 3
in the form of an injured coalition party leaving the coa-
lition. This may result in the downfall of the government
and either the calling of a general election or the formation
of a new government. Mid-term changes in the composition
of a government are not uncommon and are often motivated
by a disgruntled coalition party leaving the coalition. And an
opposition party may be able to use this opportunity to move
from the opposition to the government. Riker (1962) suggests
that political parties care most about winning ministerial
offices and that controlling government is the real prize (see
also Bäck et al., 2011; Golder et al., 2012; Laver and Schofield
1998; Laver and Shepsle 1996). This can be actualized by an
opposition party by either bringing down the existing coa-
lition or by an early general election. Either way, the path for
an opposition party to the goal of office is to divide and
conquer. And, after all, as Eggers and Spirling (2018) note, the
main opposition party is typically a government-in-waiting.
Thus, we expect an opposition party to be slightly more
nuanced in its strategy of oversight in the presence of a
coalition government, in order for the opposition party to
maximize its electoral and office goals. This is a vote-
maximizing strategy in the sense that the opposition is ex-
posing or highlighting policy concerns that it believes, as a
programmatic political party, will maximize its electoral
support at the next election. An opposition party facing a
single-party majority government has less potential to have
the government voted out of office before a general election.8
But how we do expect that uncovering issue wedges and
ministerial drift will electorally advantage the opposition
party at the next election. Uncovering and highlighting any
evidence of ministerial drift will undermine trust within the
government and lead to friction and ill will – phenomena
which surely challenge the ability of parties to work in
unison and produce effective public policy. The image here
is of a cabinet fighting with itself, unable to effectively and
efficiently produce public policy.
Of course, the illumination of policy differences between
a party’s electoral promises (in the election manifesto, for
example) and government policy can undermine support for
the party among supporters in the electorate. For example,
in the 2010 UK General Election campaign, the Liberal
Democrats signed a pledge not to increase University tuition
fees. In Government they compromised on this and by most
accounts suffered great embarrassment and an undermining
of their credibility with voters. This u-turn is often cited as a
reason for the party’s vote collapse at the 2015 general
election (Johnson and Middleton 2016). And as Fortunato
and Stevenson (2013) find, even the choice of coalition
partner impacts voters’ perception of a party’s ideology,
often more so than a party’s electoral manifesto.
Voters will observe both ineffective government and
parties not keeping their electoral promises and will ret-
rospectively punish the government at the next election.
Here we follow closely Fortunato’s (2019: 242) analysis of
the fundamental nature of electoral politics in parliamentary
systems with coalition politics: ‘Voters do not support a
party so that it may accommodate its cabinet partners in an
effort to smooth the process of governance or trade away its
core policy positions in order to obtain a fancy office. Voters
support a party with the understanding that it will pursue a
certain set of policies, and, when they believe that the party
has not rigorously fought for these policies, they are likely
to abandon it, believing that its core positions have changed
or that it is untrustworthy or incompetent’.
Finally, we should note that our argument is not that the
opposition seeks to facilitate coalition government by
keeping tabs on parties in coalition government. The goal of
the opposition is not to minimize ministerial drift, thus
allowing parties in coalition government to govern to-
gether.9 Rather, the aim of opposition parties from our
perspective is to expose ministerial drift and divisions
within the coalition and to use this to sow further conflict
and division within the government. This is done with the
intention of negatively impacting governing parties’ elec-
toral appeal while simultaneously maximizing the electoral
attractiveness of the opposition, or even breaking apart the
coalition.10
But how does an opposition party engage in oversight to
divide parties in a coalition government? As noted above,
opposition parties have a number of tools at their disposal to
help with oversight of the executive. These include par-
liamentary committees and investigations. However,
committees may be dominated by the governing parties,
providing less effective capacity for the opposition to
scrutinize executive and ministerial activity. In this article,
we focus on parliamentary questions (PQs) as a tool for
opposition oversight of the coalition.
PQs are a procedure which permits parliamentarians to
formally ask questions of, and receive answers from,
members of the executive. PQs are one of the few tools
which provide legislators with access to information on the
actions and operation of the executive (Martin and
Rozenberg 2014). Although the rules governing PQs
vary widely, they come in two fundamental forms: oral or
written. Oral questions are verbally asked and verbally
answered on the floor of the chamber. Probably the best
known example of oral PQs is Prime Minister’s Questions
in the British House of Commons. Prime Minister’s
Questions can provide for political theatre between the
executive and opposition (or even the executive and co-
partisan parliamentarians). Because oral PQs demand an on-
the-spot answer, the respondent needs to have a full in-
formational command of their area of responsibility. In
contrast, written questions are tabled (in writing) by a
member and the relevant part of the executive is given a
specific period of time to research and furnish a reply –
typically also in writing. We know that PQs are amongst the
tools that can be used by parties in coalition government to
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keep tabs on each other (Höhmann and Sieberer 2020;
Martin and Whitaker 2019). PQs are a favourite tool of the
opposition (Christiansen and Damgaard 2010; Helms 2008;
Otjes and Louwerse 2018; Proksch and Slapin 2011), in-
cluding in the United Kingdom (Parry 1997).
Consider the following example. In October 2010, La-
bour MP Gavin Shuker tabled a question on tuition fees for
university students. The question of whether tuition fees
should be increased or not was an issue that had publicly
divided the coalition partners as was clear from the coalition
agreement (HM Government 2010: 31–32), which set out
conditions under which the Liberal Democrats would be
permitted to abstain from a vote on this topic, and from the
level of Liberal Democrat rebellion in votes on this issue in
the House of Commons in December 2010:
Gavin Shuker (Luton South): To ask the Secretary of State for
Business, Innovation and Skills what assessment he has made
of the effects on higher education participation among the
poorest students of increases in tuition fees.11
The question illustrates the central claim of this article:
intra-coalition monitoring is not just something undertaken
by legislators from within the coalition. Opposition legis-
lators can and do perform this role (and, rationally may be
even more likely to want to perform this role).
But in general, does the opposition party use PQs as a
tool to uncover and target intra-coalition divisions? To
answer this, we conduct a study of PQ patterns during the
2010–15 coalition government in the UK. Based on our
arguments above about the potential of PQs as a coalition
monitoring tool, we expect the opposition party to target
questions strategically where the policy divergence within
the coalition is greatest. Specifically, we would expect
Labour Party MPs (the Official Opposition party) to ask
questions in greater numbers on topics where there are
particularly high levels of ideological conflict between the
coalition partners. At the same time, we still expect the
Labour Party to be partly motivated by their own policy
priorities. It makes sense not only to expose tensions within
the governing coalition but also to draw attention to the
opposition party’s own policy priorities as part of their
electoral strategy. We therefore expect to see more PQs
asked for areas of higher salience to the Labour Party, all
else equal. The next section introduces our case.
The British Case
The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy, with
the cabinet responsible to the directly elected House of
Commons. The 2010 general election produced a hung
parliament and following negotiations a coalition govern-
ment was formed between the centre-right Conservative
Party and centrist Liberal Democrats – the first formal
coalition in post-war Britain. The coalition agreement set
out a programme of policies to be enacted by the gov-
ernment (Hazell and Yong 2012; Quinn et al., 2011). Al-
though an aberration in modern British politics, the coalition
government operated remarkably similarly to governments
in other coalition systems, with co-operation and unity
punctuated occasionally by inter-party conflict over policies
(Laws 2016). The Labour party formed the official oppo-
sition. As Eggers and Spirling (2018) note, the opposition
party within the British House of Commons is procedurally
very weak in terms of law-making scrutiny. However, the
opposition does have a number of oversight tools, primarily
among them the ability to table PQs. Any MP can ask a
question to any member of the cabinet. A system of par-
liamentary questions is one means by which ministerial
responsibility is put into effect (Franklin and Norton 1993).
Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) are the highlight of the
parliamentary week, and one of the most important means
by which the opposition can challenge the government
(Bevan and John 2016) and win political support (Bates
et al., 2014). Written questions are asked in large numbers in
the UK Parliament.12
We will return to the generalizability of our argument in
the conclusion, but for now it is worth noting that we do not
think of the UK as a most likely case for finding evidence in
favour of our divide and conquer thesis. Although the UK
Parliament has a robust system of PQs, coalition govern-
ments are uncommon. In this sense, the case selection ar-
guably acts to make finding a relationship between
coalitions and opposition behaviour more difficult.13
Data and analysis
We test our theory with a dataset of all written questions asked
by Labour MPs in the 2010–15 Parliament. Our dependent
variable is the number of questions asked by each Labour MP
to each department of government. This variable ranges from
0 to 1834, has amean of 20.5 and a standard deviation of 59.9.
Our main independent variable concerns the policy gap be-
tween the coalition parties for each department of govern-
ment. We measure parties’ policy positions using Lowe et al.
(2011)’s transformation of theManifesto Research on Political
Representation (MARPOR) dataset (Volkens et al., 2016).
These data are based on the proportions of manifestos taken
up by particular policy areas. They allow for a much more
fine-grained measure of policy than would be possible with
expert judgement data (e.g. Bakker et al., 2015), which have
far fewer categories of policy.
Lowe et al. (2011) offer a series of policy scales for major
policy areas but their approach also allows for new policy
scales to be created to fit particular ministries’ jurisdictions,
as we have done for the Foreign Office and Department of
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (see Table S1 in the
SupplementaryMaterial). We calculate the absolute value of
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the gap between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats
for policy areas linked to each government department.
Table 1 shows which party headed which department and
the policy scale we used for measuring positions. We provide
robustness tests in our Supplementary Material (Table S3)
using different Lowe et al. (2011) measures for depart-
ments’ policy areas. Apart from the measure of Labour’s
gap to the ministry-holding party in one case in Table S3 –
where the coefficient drops out of significance – none of our
results change substantially in these alternative model
specifications. We also estimate our model with jackknife
standard errors based on removing one MP from the data at
a time (Table S4). Table 1 shows the absolute value of the
gap between the two parties for each ministry and the
absolute value of the gap between Labour and the coalition
party heading each department.
We consider this latter variable because we expect that
Labour will not only want to expose or exacerbate gaps
between the coalition partners but may also want to draw
attention to those policy areas in which it differs from the
governing coalition, in an attempt to signal a distinctive
position to its voters. Policy positions for Labour are
measured using the same approach as for the Conservatives
and Liberal Democrats. We then calculate the absolute value
of the gap between Labour’s position and that of the party in
charge of the relevant government department. We expect
these incentives may vary by whether a Labour MP sits on
the frontbench or not. Those holding shadow frontbench
positions may be under more pressure from the party
leadership than backbenchers to ask questions and partic-
ularly in areas where the coalition partners are further apart
and areas where Labour is further from the party holding the
ministry. This may be seen as part of the party leadership’s
efforts to do all they can to improve their electoral prospects.
Hence, we include a dummy variable which is given the
value of 1 for Labour MPs who held a leadership position as
a shadow cabinet member or shadow junior minister at some
point in the 2010–15 Parliament, and 0 for other cases. We
expect a positive coefficient here. Data on opposition posts
are taken from the data.parliament.uk website.
We expect the salience of each policy area to affect
patterns of questioning, that is, Labour MPs should ask more
PQs in areas that are more important to the party, in an at-
tempt to signal policy priorities to voters. Lowe et al. (2011)
offer a measure of policy importance based on a similar
approach to their measures of positions. We apply this to the
same MARPOR codes as with the position measures. As a
less party-specific measure of the importance of each de-
partment we control for the proportion of public spending
that went to each department (HM Treasury, 2011: 27).14 We
anticipate a positive relationship between proportion of
spending and numbers of questions asked.
Table 1. Cabinet portfolio distribution and gaps between the coalition parties and between Labour and parties holding ministries in the
2010–15 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition.
Portfolio/position Party holding ministry
Absolute value of gap between
parties (and scale used)
Absolute gap between Lab
and party holding ministry
Prime Minister Conservative n/a n/a
Deputy Prime Minister Liberal Democrat 1.95 (Constitutionalism) 0.24
Foreign Office Conservative 0.92 (Foreign office)* 0.33
Treasury Conservative 0.42 (State involvement in economy) 0.75
Justice Conservative 0.26 (Social Liberal-Conservative) 0.17
Home Office Conservative 0.26 (Social Liberal-Conservative) 0.17
Defence Conservative 3.89 (Militarism) 0.28
Business, Innovation and Skills Liberal Democrat 0.93 (Free market economy) 0.77
Work and Pensions Conservative 1.31 (Welfare state) 3.51
Energy and Climate Change Liberal Democrat 1.64 (Environmental protection) 0.03
Health Conservative 0.93 (Free market economy) 0.16
Education Conservative 0.54 (Education spending) 0.94
Communities and Local Government Conservative 0.56 (Decentralization) 1.00
Transport Conservative 0.93 (Free market economy) 0.16
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Conservative 0.64 (Environment and agriculture)* 0.21
International Development Conservative 1.37 (Internationalism) 1.66
Northern Ireland Conservative 0.56 (Decentralization) 1.00
Scotland Liberal Democrat 0.56 (Decentralization) 0.45
Wales Conservative 0.56 (Decentralization) 1.00
Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport Conservative 0.93 (Free market economy) 0.16
Note: gaps are calculated using scores created by the Lowe et al. (2011) transformations of MARPOR data. *Indicates a scale created by the authors using
the Lowe et al. (2011) approach. Details of the MARPOR codes on which these new scales are based can be found in the Supplementary Material, Table S1.
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We include several other control variables. MPs’ deci-
sions about whether to ask questions of a particular de-
partment may be driven partly by their own policy interests.
We use membership of departmental select committees as a
proxy for this. We include a variable scoring 1 if an MP
served, for at least some of the 2010–15 term, on a select
committee that monitored the department of which they are
asking questions, and zero otherwise. We expect a positive
coefficient for this variable. Data on select committee
membership were taken from Parliament’s website. We
measure how long each MP had served in the Commons (in
years by 2010) on the basis that longer serving members
may feel more secure and therefore feel less pressure to ask
PQs than those new to Parliament. Following Kellermann
(2016), we test whether more electorally vulnerable MPs
ask more PQs in order to signal effort to their constituents.
This is measured by the difference in percentage points
between the vote share achieved by the winner and the
candidate in second place for each MP at the 2010 general
election.15 We control for differences between men and
women, on the basis of research providing evidence of
different views of representational roles among women
(Taylor-Robinson 2017: 252–253). Descriptive statistics for
all the variables used in our analysis can be found in Table
S2 in the Supplementary Material.
Our dependent variable consists of count data. The
standard approach here would be to use a Poisson regression
model. However, our data do not meet the requirements of
this in that they are over-dispersed. In other words, the
variance of the dependent variable (conditional on the effect
of the independent variables) is greater than the conditional
mean. In addition, our dependent variable includes a large
percentage of zeros (25.5%). We take account of both these
features by using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression
model (Long 1997: 243–247). This includes an estimate of
the over-dispersion in the data. The approach involves two
models, a negative binomial count model in which we at-
tempt to explain variations in the numbers of questions, and a
model which attempts to explain the presence of zeros in the
data. For the latter model, we include a variable measuring
whether MPs serve a full term or not. This is on the basis that
those in the House of Commons for less time have fewer
opportunities to ask questions; hence, we expect this variable
to have a positive effect on the likelihood of asking no
questions of a department. As there is a degree of clustering in
our data (some departments are clustered within policy
scales), our model includes standard errors clustered by
policy scales. Results are presented in Table 2.
Table 2 shows, as expected, a positive effect on the
number of questions asked for the policy gap between the
coalition partners. Our model predicts that – with other
variables held at their mean or modal (for dummy variables)
value – as we move from the smallest gap between the
Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties observed in our
data (0.262) to the largest (3.893), the number of questions
asked by Labour MPs to a department rises almost three
times, moving from 11 to 32 (rounding to the nearest whole
number). This is consistent with our argument that an
opposition party will use PQs strategically to push at gaps
between the parties in a coalition government. Nevertheless,
we find that Labour also use these questions to draw attention
to areas where they are further from the party holding a
particular ministry. This is shown by the positive coefficient
for the ‘policy gap between Labour and ministry party’
variable in Model 1. Holding other variables at their mean or
mode (for dummies), we find an increase from 13 to 23
questions asked as the gap between Labour and government
departments rises from itsminimum (0.03) tomaximum (3.51)
observed values. We were also interested to see how the
number of questions asked changes at different values of the
gap between Labour and the party holding a particular gov-
ernment department. Figures 1 and 2 show this relationship for
a gap of zero (Figure 1) and the maximum observed gap
(Figure 2) between Labour and the party running a ministry.
These two figures illustrate that while Labour ask more
questions of departments where tensions are likely to be
higher between the coalition parties, they do this to a greater
extent when they are further away from the party holding the
ministry. So they attempt to increase tensions between the




standard error in brackets)
Negative binomial count model
Policy gap between coalition partners 0.29** (0.12)




Policy importance for Labour 0.63*** (0.08)
Shadow minister/cabinet minister 0.53*** (0.06)
Female 0.32*** (0.06)
Time served as MP (in years) 0.01*** (0.00)
Majority size 0.01 (0.00)
Served on relevant select
committee
1.27*** (0.09)









Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are adjusted for 13
clusters in policy scales.16
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coalition partners and they do this to a greater degree when
they are further from the party holding the ministry.
Even when we take into account the effects of gaps
between the coalition partners and of gaps between Labour
and the coalition, we also find – as expected – that Labour
ask more questions in policy areas that are of more
importance to them. This effect is substantively important
with a change in the predicted number of PQs from 3 at the
lowest observed level of policy importance, to 43 at the
highest level (with other variables at their mean or mode).
Our other control variables largely perform as expected.
MPs who held a shadow government post at some point in
Figure 1. Effect of policy gap between coalition partners on number of questions asked by Labour MPs when Labour’s policy gap to the
government is zero.
Figure 2. Effect of policy gap between coalition partners on number of questions asked by Labour MPs when Labour’s policy gap to the
government is at its maximum value.
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the 2010–15 term ask more PQs than others do. MPs ask
more questions of departments for which they sat on the
relevant select committee for at least some of the 2010–15
term. This indicates that policy interests influence ques-
tioning patterns as expected. MPs with more experience in
the House of Commons ask fewer PQs. We find that higher
shares of public expenditure were associated with higher
levels of questioning of government departments. Our var-
iable measuring the size of MPs’ majorities is just short of
conventional levels of statistical significance (p=0.109) in-
dicating a somewhat uncertain negative relationship between
numbers of questions asked and majority size. Our model
shows female MPs asking very slightly fewer questions than
male MPs (10 compared with 14) when we hold other
variables at their mean (or mode for dummies). The part of
our model that predicts the occurrence of zeros in the data
suggests the failure to serve a full term is indeed strongly
associated with the absence of questions as we expected.
Conclusion
Coalition government requires otherwise competitive governing
parties to cooperate over the production and implementation of
public policy. A growing body of research explores how po-
litical parties in government ‘keep tabs’ on each other.While it is
now widely accepted that the legislative process allows actors
within a coalition government to monitor each other, less at-
tention has focused on whether or how opposition parties be-
have during periods of coalition government.
Building on the wedge-issue strategy, our suggestion in
this article is that opposition parties have incentives, and the
capacity, to focus on uncovering and highlighting policy
differences and tensions within the coalition, including
potential for ministerial drift from any coalition agreement.
Our analysis of parliamentary questions during the 2010–15
coalition government in the UK House of Commons shows
that it is not only coalition parties who may act strategically
in light of differences between the members of a coalition.
Opposition parties may exploit gaps between coalition
partners in an attempt to divide and ultimately conquer the
government. This happens alongside opposition attempts to
show their own differences from the parties of government
and to raise the profile of areas high on their own list of
priorities. Those with shadow government posts (opposition
spokespersons) are particularly likely to ask questions.
This research highlights the importance of opposition
parties in parliamentary democracies. Future research should
explore the conditions under which opposition parties target
oversight of particular ministries and whether similar op-
position strategies are employed in the presence of a single-
party government but with strong party factions. Although
our findings are based on a single case study, with arguably
particular features, we expect that the core thesis is a gen-
eralizable one. If anything, the particular features – and in
particular the lack of a tradition of coalition governance –
arguably make the UK a relatively hard test of our expec-
tations. Legislatures with a tradition of coalition governance
are more likely to have opposition parties who know how to
employ oversight tools to divide and conquer the coalition
parties. Any multiparty legislature with a coalition govern-
ment, opposition party and system of PQs should, we sense,
provide the framework for coalition parties to act strategically
during periods of coalition government.
Future research should explore the generalizability of our
argument and the scope conditions. For example, in the
context of Falcó-Gimeno’s (2014) important insights into
how preference tangentiality shapes the need for intra-
coalition monitoring, we would expect preference tangen-
tiality among coalition parties to similarly reduce the gains to
opposition parties for engaging in a ‘divide to conquer’
strategy.17 We would only expect opposition parties to use
parliamentary questions to cause conflict within the coalition
when two or more of the coalition parties did not have
tangential preferences. An opposition would derive little
benefit from seeking to ‘divide and conquer’ coalition parties
when the parties, in the words of Falcó-Gimeno (2014: 345)
‘care about a concrete group of policy areas and not much
about those controlled by their partners’. As such, when
studied comparatively, we would not expect to see opposition
parties use PQs to divide and conquer the coalition when
coalition parties have preference tangentiality.
Finally, the capacity of PQs to facilitate coalition moni-
toring by the opposition may depend on the strength of the
questioning system – for example whether ministers must
answer PQs, whether they must do so honestly, and whether
the topics and volume of potential questions to ministers are
unfettered. As recent events in the UK Parliament – including
BREXIT and parliament’s role in shaping and overseeing
policy responses to the Covid pandemic – remind us, much
more needs to be done to uncover the real power and in-
fluence of parliaments and in particular opposition parties.
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Notes
1. We should clarify that we focus interchangeably on policy
divisiveness between parties in the coalition and ministerial
drift. Policy divisiveness occurs when parties in a coalition
government have different policy preferences on a given topic
or portfolio, as we would expect competitive political parties
to have in some or possibly all areas of policy. Ministerial drift
is a situation where one or more ministers in a coalition
government deviates from the agreed coalition agreement, be
it a formal policy agreement or a more informal understanding
of what constitutes the government’s policy position. From
our perspective, ministerial drift is caused by policy divi-
siveness. Absent policy divisiveness between parties in the
coalition agreement, we would not expect to see deviation
from the agreed coalition policy. And absent tools to monitor,
punish, or prevent ministerial drift, ministerial drift in the
presence of divisiveness is a rational strategy for a party or
minister within a coalition government.
2. We do know from Martin and Vanberg (2004: 23) that they
‘find no evidence that bills that divide the government from
the opposition are likely to face legislative delay. Moreover, it
appears that bills dealing with more salient issues from the
opposition’s perspective are actually less likely to move
quickly through the legislature’.
3. Not all oversight mechanisms would permit the opposition to
publicize any coalition tensions. For example, the Leader of
the Opposition may receive confidential intelligence briefings
from the UK security services. Owing to the classified and
sensitive nature of such information, it would seem improper
for the opposition to use any information gleaned in this way
for electoral purposes.
4. Which in the United Kingdom would be referred to as Her
Majesty’s Loyal Opposition – the largest party by number of
MPs who are not represented in cabinet.
5. Of course, parties have multiple, often competing goals
(Müller and Strøm 1999).
6. Exploring national election results in 17 European countries
between 1945 and 1999, Narud and Valen (2008, 379) find
that incumbent parties lost, on average, 2.59% of the vote,
with the mean loss rising to 6.28% of the vote in the 1990s.
7. In contrast, Van de Wardt et al. (2014) suggest that non-
governing parties may be cautious about exploiting wedge
issues within the coalition because ‘[f]or mainstream oppo-
sition parties that routinely alternate between government and
opposition, wedge-issue competition could risk imperiling
relationships with past and prospective coalition partners. In
contrast, wedge-issue competition involves far less risk for
challenger parties which have never participated in govern-
ment coalitions, and such parties are therefore more likely to
mobilize wedge issues compared to their mainstream coun-
terparts in opposition’ (p. 987). While this argument may hold
for issues such as European integration in the presence of
challenger parties (parties not motivated by being in
government) we are less convinced by the general argument
that opposition parties will forego ‘opposing’ the governing
parties for the chance of government formation after the next
election.
8. We say less potential, because even with a single-party
government, opposition parties will seek to draw attention
to issues that are divisive within the party. Any party with two
or more members may have factions. It may be the case that an
opposition party facing a single-party majority party may well
seek to divide and conquer by exploiting any factionalism that
exists in the governing party. Hence, there may be a similar
electoral strategic logic behind parliamentary questions raised
to a single-party government with strong party factions or
facing divisive intra-party policy issues.
9. We are grateful to a reviewer for pointing this out.
10. The Irish case illustrates how a coalition can be broken apart
and specifically how a change in the partisan composition of
government can take place between elections, with an op-
position party entering government by replacing one of the
governing parties in the coalition. In 1994 the incumbent
Fianna Fáil-Labour party collation had been governing for
2 years when the Labour Party withdrew from the cabinet. As
Gary (1995: 192) notes, the government collapsed “because of
a breakdown in trust between the two party leaders.” Despite
significant policy overlap between the parties, the opposition
and media probed governance differences between the parties,
and particularly issues around corruption and judicial ap-
pointments, details of which ultimately led the Labour Party to
walk out of cabinet. Having withdrawn from Government, the
Labour Party subsequently agreed a new coalition government
with what had been the main opposition party – and Fianna
Fáil’s arch rivals at the time – Fine Gael (along with a third and
smaller left-wing party). In December 1994, the new Gov-
ernment was voted into office by means of a parliamentary
investiture vote (Martin 2015) and governed until the 1997
general election.
11. 517,276, Written Answers to Questions, Thursday 14 October
2010.
12. Scholars have recognized the potential of PQs records to
provide unique and exact insight into the preferences and
concerns of individual MPs. For example, Bird (2005) ex-
plores whether PQs are used as a tool to represent gendered
interests, Saalfeld (2011) and Saalfeld and Bischof (2013)
suggest that PQs at Westminster may be a tool to represent the
interests of visible minorities, as does Kolpinskaya (2017)
with reference to religious interests. Kellermann (2016) finds
that MPs ask PQs to signal effort, rather than as a form of
constituency service (Martin 2011).
13. Falcó-Gimeno (2014) suggests that intra-coalition monitoring
devices of any kind should only be employed by parties in the
coalition agreement when parties in the coalition care about
the same policy jurisdictions. Our sense is that in the 2010–15
coalition government, both parties had at least some interest in
the policy jurisdictions held by the other party. For example,
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the Liberal Democrats held the business ministry – a policy
jurisdiction close to the hearts of the Conservative Party.
Indeed, Martin and Whitaker (2019) demonstrate that parties
in the UK Coalition 2010–15 did use parliamentary tools to
keep tabs on each other.
14. These are measured as the percentage of all departmental ex-
penditure limits associated with each department for the 2010–
11 financial year at 2010–11 prices (HM Treasury 2011: 27).
15. Data on electoral majorities are taken from the British Election
Study 2015 Constituency Results Version 2.0 (DOI: 10.
13140/RG.2.1.1162.1844) and supplemented with data from
Wikipedia for MPs elected in by-elections during the 2010–15
Parliament.
16. In order to check the appropriateness of a zero-inflated model
over a standard negative binomial model, we use Desmarais
and Jarden’s (2013) corrected versions of the Vuong test
implemented in Stata. These tests show clear evidence to
support the use of zero-inflated negative binomial model over
its standard counterpart.
17. Helpfully, Andeweg and Timmermans (2008: 276) describe
coalition preference tangentiality as a situation where ‘issues
are of differing salience to different parties; one party may
emphasize cultural issues but be relatively indifferent about
economic issues, while a coalition partner may weight the
issues in the opposite way’.
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